FREEDOM FROM TERROR For All

Not Looking Good For Carroll's Release

Not Looking Good For Carroll's Release

Terms and conditions have changed in terms of Carroll's release. Communications with the group holding her and a media mogul in Kuwait have been going on for some time. According to him, she is "in a safe house in Baghdad, with other women, doing house work."

The Kuwaiti "liason" of sorts alleges that those holding Carroll were the same ones who held the two Simonas, the Italian aide workers who were ultimately released for a $1million ransom. Grimmer intelligence reports have linked the group holding Carroll to the ones who held Margaret Hassan.

Nothing more to be reported at this time.

Why We Are Not Reporting on Jill Carroll

Why We Are Not Reporting on Jill Carroll

Please accept our apologies for having kept silent on the matter. Jill is a colleague of some members of our "team" and we are in touch with one another as well as others close to her.

This is why we have been silent in general and hope that our faithful readers understand.

Feel free to leave posts if you wish.

FFTFA Copyright 2005. All Rights Reserved.

Merry Christmas, Happy Chanukka, Happy New Year....God Is Great!!

We get hits from all over the world, so to all of you, Merry Christmas, Happy Chanukka and Happy 2006.

Make it a great year and hopefully the coming year will be one with more happy events to report on.

GOD Bless

GOD is Great!

Where Is Ronald Allen Schulz

Where is Ronald Allen Schulz??

Inquiries are coming in from all over the world about Ronald Allen Schulz.

Analysts have drawn connections with the group holding Mr. Schulz with the same group holding the Christian Aid Workers.

There is more evidence that this is the same group as Ansar Al Islam, the Kurdish wing of Al Qaeda. Zarqawi is traveling on Kurdish papers and has been alleged to be with Ansar Al Islam, often toted as "the one" who killed Nicolas Berg and others under the guise of Ansar Al-Islam.

So if there is a tape of an execution of Mr. Schulz, would it lead directly to Zarqawi?

Maybe there is no execution video and he is as fortunate as Douglas Wood?

Whatever the outcome is, there is a DEFINATE CRY FOR THIS MAN FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD.

To the family of Ronald Allen Schulz and even Mr. Schulz himself if you can see this: there are many people out there concerned for you and praying for you.

FFTFA Copyright 2005. All Rights Reserved.

Richard Pryor, A Beacon of American Freedom Died Today

Richard Pryor, A Becon of American Freedom Died Today

Comedian Richard Pryor died this morning at the age of 65 of a heart attack. His wife tried fruitlessly to revive him.

Mr Pryor had been struggling with late stage MS for at least a decade so this was not a shock to those who knew him well, but none the less his loved ones are stunned just the same.

Loved by people of all races and religions and known as quiet and humble by his colleagues and friends, Mr. Pryor is a true representative of the American dream. He was raised in a brothel that his grandmother own where his own mother worked. He was a true pheonix who rose out of the ashes.

Rest in Peace, and thanks for making so many Americans, black and white, laugh with you and not at you.

FFTFA Copyright 2005. All Rights Reserved.

www.freedomfromterror.org

Adios Padilla, Via Con Dios, Ooops I Mean Allah, Sorry

Adios Padilla Via Con Dios, I Mean Allah Sorry 'Bout That

FFTFA has just obtained a copy of the indictment and will be posting as much of the details of the deposition, etc that we can, so hang on and we will keep you posted.

As an American Citizen he can be held indefinately and there are many things that are now being made public that were not before.

Stay tuned

FFTFA Copyright 2005. All Rights Reserved.

www.freedomfromterror.org

Signals Prior To This Attack

Signals Prior To This Attack

Aside from the obvious Hashemite vs. Palestinian or the King of Jordan's friendship with President Bush, there were other clues not necessarily as obvious.

The Muslims of Jordan are 100 percent Sunni. So this is not about the Sunni/Shiite conflict exactly. However, the Jordanian government was training Iraqi Army and police forces, Shiite or Sunni, which makes them "traitors" in the eyes of the likes of AQ and Abu Musab al Zarqawi.

But there is more..... Last week when the Embassy workers from Morocco were kidnapped, they were on their way to Jordan from Baghdad. It is anyone's guess what was allegedly obtained in their "possession".

The 9/11 "Anniversary" message by Adam PEARLMAN Gadhan (aka Azzam the American) whereby he threatens Melbourne and Los Angeles was RE RELEASED this week on various AQ affiliated websites. Why? Because in Europe and other parts of the world today is literally 9/11 (as they list the day before the month).

Earlier this week 17 members of the primarily Pakistan group Hizb-Al Tarir were detained while in the final stages of a major terrorist attack in Australia. PEARLMAN Gadhan is based in Pakistan. Coincidence?

The last act of terrorism in Jordan occurred in the Gulf of Aquba. The code words for the attacks were something to the effect of "the wedding party is underway." Today's highest fatality count took place when a suicide/homicide bomber walked into a (Sunni Muslim no less) wedding party and detonated himself amongst the 300 guests.

Finally, within ONE hour of today's attacks in Jordan, the State Department put out a warning to Americans staying in 4 and 5 Star Hotels in China to be on a vigilant state of alert, as intelligence indicated a possible serious attack was imminent there as well.

FFTFA Copyright 2005. All Rights Reserved.

www.freedomfromterror.org

Henry Kissenger's Take on the War on Terror vs. Past Wars

Khaleej Times Online >> Columnist >> HENRY A. KISSINGER
The wary lessons of history

August 12 2005
GEN. George Casey, the commander of US forces in Iraq, has announced that the United States intends to begin a "fairly substantial’’ withdrawal of US forces from Iraq soon after the projected December elections establish a constitutional government. Other sources have indicated that this will involve 30,000 troops, or some 22 per cent of the total US forces in Iraq. The withdrawal is said to be made possible by improvements in the security situation and progress in the training of Iraqi forces to replace American troops.

But how are these terms to be defined? In a war without front lines, does a lull indicate success or a strategic decision by the adversary? Is a decline in enemy attacks due to attrition or to a deliberate enemy strategy of conserving forces to encourage American withdrawal?

For someone like me, who observed at first hand the anguish of the original involvement in Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and who later participated in the decisions to withdraw during the Nixon administration, Gen. Casey’s announcement revived poignant memories. For the decision to withdraw substantial American forces while the war continues is a potentially fateful event. It will affect the calculations of insurgents and government forces alike so that the definition of progress becomes nearly as much a psychological as a military judgment. Every soldier withdrawn will represent a larger percentage of the remaining total. The capacity for offensive action of the remaining forces will shrink. Once the process is started, it runs the risk of operating by momentum rather than by strategic analysis, and that process is increasingly difficult to reverse.

Despite such handicaps, the decision to replace U.S. forces with local armies during the Vietnam War — labelled Vietnamisation’ — was, from the security point of view, on the whole successful. Between 1969 and the end of 1972, over 500,000 US troops were withdrawn. American involvement in ground combat ended in early 1971. US casualties were reduced from an average of 400 a week in 1968 and early 1969 to an average of 20 a week in 1972.

These measures were made possible because, after the failure of Hanoi’s Tet offensive of 1968, the guerrilla threat was substantially eliminated. Saigon and all other urban centres were far safer than major cities in Iraq are today. American personnel could walk the streets essentially unarmed and without escort. Saigon controlled perhaps 80 per cent of the country with relatively well-established front lines. Vietnamese army units were increasingly able to repel offensives from the regular forces of Hanoi. When the Vietnamese army, with substantial American aerial support — but no combat ground forces — broke the back of the North Vietnamese all-out offensive in 1972, Vietnamisation could be judged a success. Shortly afterward, the North Vietnamese accepted terms they had rejected for four years. (That they did does not settle the debate, however, whether a different withdrawal rate — slower, faster, or none at all until after a settlement — could have speeded that day.) Three years later, these results were reversed, not as the result of internal violence but of an external attack by Hanoi’s conventional military force, in violation of every provision of the Paris agreement.

America’s emotional exhaustion with the war and the domestic travail of Watergate had reduced economic and military aid to Vietnam by two-thirds, and Congress prohibited military support, even via airpower, to the besieged ally. None of the countries that had served as guarantors of the agreement was prepared to lift even a diplomatic finger.

All this demonstrated two principles applicable to Iraq: Military success is difficult to sustain unless buttressed by domestic support. And an international framework needs to be fostered within which the new Iraq can find its place.

History, of course, never repeats itself precisely. Vietnam was a battle of the Cold War; Iraq is an episode in the struggle against radical Islam. The stake in the Cold War was perceived to be the political survival of independent nation-states allied with the United States around the Soviet periphery. The war in Iraq is less about geopolitics than the clash of ideologies, cultures, religious beliefs. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have an even deeper significance than Vietnam. If a Taleban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shockwaves would ripple through the Islamic world.

Radical forces in existing Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. This is why many opponents of the decision to start the war agree with the proposition that a catastrophic outcome would have grave global consequences — a fundamental difference from the Vietnam debate. On the other hand, the military challenge in Iraq is more elusive. Local Iraqi forces are being trained for a combat entirely different from the traditional land battles of the last phase of the Vietnam War.

There are no front lines; the battlefield is everywhere. We face a shadowy enemy pursuing four principal objectives: 1) to expel foreigners from Iraq; 2) to penalize Iraqis cooperating with the occupation; 3) to create a chaos out of which an Islamic government of their Islamist persuasion will emerge as a model for other Islamic states; 4) to turn Iraq into a base for training for the next round of fighting, probably in moderate Arab states like Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Jordan.

North Vietnamese forces possessed heavy weapons, had sanctuaries in adjoining countries, and numbered at least half a million trained troops. Iraqi insurgents number in the tens of thousands and are lightly armed. Their most effective weapon is a homemade explosive, their most effective delivery system is the suicide bomber and their most frequent targets are unarmed civilians.

The Iraqi population has shown extraordinary equanimity in the face of this deliberate and systematic slaughter. In the end, its perception will determine the outcome as much as the military situation. It will know how secure it is; it will determine the sacrifices it is prepared to make.

In essence, the Iraqi war is a contest over whose side’s assessment turns out to be correct. The insurgents bet that by exacting a toll among supporters of the government and collaborators with America, they can frighten an increasing number of civilians into, at a minimum, staying on the sidelines, thereby undermining the government and helping the insurgents by default. The Iraqi government and the United States count on a different kind of attrition: that possibly the insurgents’ concentration on civilian carnage is due to the relatively small number of insurgents, which obliges them to conserve manpower and to shrink from attacking hard targets; hence the insurgency can gradually be worn down.

Because of the axiom that guerrillas win if they do not lose, stalemate is unacceptable. American strategy, including a withdrawal process, will stand or fall not on whether it maintains the existing security situation but whether the capacity to improve it is enhanced.

The quality of intelligence will be crucial. Specifically, the following issues require attention: How do we assess the fighting capacity of the insurgents and their strategy? To what level must attacks on civilians be reduced and over what period of time before a province can be described as pacified? What is the real combat-effectiveness of Iraqi security forces and against what kind of dangers? To what extent are the Iraqi forces penetrated by insurgents? How will such penetration affect their combat-effectiveness? How will Iraqi forces react to insurgent blackmail — for example, if a general’s son is kidnapped? What is the role of infiltration from neighbouring countries, especially Syria and Iran? How can it be defeated?

Experience in Vietnam suggests that the effectiveness of local forces is profoundly affected by the political framework. South Vietnam had about 11 divisions, two in each of the four corps areas and three others constituting a reserve. In practice, only the reserve forces could be used throughout the country. The divisions defending the provinces in which they were stationed and from which they were recruited were often quite effective. They helped defeat the North Vietnamese all-out offensive in 1972. When moved into a different and unfamiliar corps area, however, they proved far less steady, which was one of the reasons for the disasters of 1975.

The Iraqi equivalent may well be the ethnic and religious antagonisms between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. In Vietnam, the effectiveness of forces depended on geographic ties. But the provinces did not perceive themselves in conflict with each other. In Iraq, each of the various ethnic and religious groupings sees themselves in an irreconcilable, perhaps mortal, confrontation with the others. Each group has what amounts to its own geographically concentrated militia. In the Kurdish area, for example, internal security is maintained by Kurdish forces, and the presence of the national army is kept to a minimum, if not totally prevented. The same holds true to a substantial extent in the Shia region.

Is it then possible to speak of a national army at all? Today the Iraqi forces are in their majority composed of Shias, and the insurrection is mostly in traditional Sunni areas. It thus foreshadows a return to the traditional Sunni-Shia conflict only with reversed capabilities. These forces may cooperate in quelling the Sunni insurrection. But will they, even when adequately trained, be willing to quell Shia militia in the name of the nation? Do they obey the ayatollahs, especially Sistani, or the national government in Baghdad? And if these two entities are functionally the same, can the national army make its writ run in non-Shia areas except as an instrument of repression? And is it then still possible to maintain a democratic state? The ultimate test of progress will therefore be the extent to which the Iraqi armed forces reflect — at least to some degree — the ethnic diversity of the country and are accepted by the population at large as an expression of the nation. Drawing Sunni leaders into the political process is an important part of an anti-insurgent strategy. Failing that, the process of building security forces may become the prelude to a civil war.

Can a genuine nation emerge in Iraq through constitutional means? The answer to that question will determine whether Iraq becomes a signpost for a reformed Middle East or the pit of an ever-spreading conflict. For these reasons, a withdrawal schedule should be accompanied by some political initiative inviting an international framework for Iraq’s future. Some of our allies may prefer to act as bystanders, but reality will not permit this for their own safety. Their cooperation is needed, not so much for the military as for the political task, which will test, above all, the West’s statesmanship in shaping a global system relevant to its necessities.

Henry A Kissinger, the most famous and controversial former US secretary of state, is credited with formulating the US foreign policy during the Cold war

Dr Henry Kissinger is by far the most admired Secretary of State in US history, a diplomat par excellence, and a top intellectual of our times, informed as he is by a 'deep historical knowledge, wit, a gift for irony, and a unique understanding of the forces that bind nations'. He had injected a new dynamism to the US foreign policy during his term between 1973 and 1977, that, among other things, effected a major turn-around in Sino-US relations. He continues to hog limelight, unveiling refreshing thoughts about the state of the world.

The Female Suicide Bomber is Bad News For US and Coalition Forces

If the other 50% of the population is jumping in, this cannot be a good thing for the other side.

This is a sign of serious desperation on their part and if we did not realize that these people will stop at nothing with their sons, they are now ready and willing to send their daughters, sisters, and possibly wives and mothers out to detonate themselves.

This cycle will continue, there is no doubt.

FFTFA Copyright 2005. All Rights Reserved.

www.freedomfromterror.org

FEMALE Suicide Bomber in Tal Afar, Iraq

On September 28, 2005 AQ put out an announcement that a "female woman of the group" targetted a gathering of "converted volunteers" at an Army Recruitment Center in Tal Afar.

Tal Afar is the Turkmen/Shiite town where the folks followed muqtada al-sadr who ironically befriended the Shiite hating Zarqawi. The Turkmen Shiites then allowed AQ to hide out there.

The new president of Iraq, a Shiite, made a deal with the Turkmen so that they will join forces with the mainstream Shiites in Iraq. He offered them complete protection if they turn over all information regarding AQ and its forces in the area.

This is why groups like the Victorious Army are going after the Shiites in Tal Afar right now.

Mainstream media is confirming that this was indeed a female suicide bomber. She was dressed in male robes and detonated at the Tal Afar recrietment center.

In the statement released by Abu Maysara Al-Iraq Information Department of AQ in the Land of Two Rivers (Iraq), the woman was only ID's as a "sister from al-Bara'a bin Malik Suicide Brigade.

FFTFA Copyright 2005. All Rights Reserved.

www.freedomfromterror.org